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Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity

Received: 2 June 2023     Accepted: 20 June 2023     Published: 6 July 2023
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Abstract

Here I have focused on R M Adams’s view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus’s notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term ‘individual essence’ – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as ‘Primitive thisness’ and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that de re identity or transworld identity is primitive in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.

Published in Advances in Sciences and Humanities (Volume 9, Issue 3)
DOI 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
Page(s) 90-96
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

de dicto, de re, Primitive Thisness, Transworld Identity, Haeccity

References
[1] Adams R. M., ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’, Kim J et al (ed), Metaphysics: An Anthology, Blackwell, USA, 2012, pp109-211.
[2] Fine K, ‘Essence and Modality’, Metaphysics: An Anthology, (ed) Jaegwon Kim, Daniel Z. Korman and Ernest Sosa, Blackwell Publishers, 2012.
[3] Fine, K, Modality and Tense, Oxford University, Oxford 1964.
[4] Frege, G, ‘On Sense and Reference’ Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960.
[5] Grayling, A. C, An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, Harvester Press, Brighton 1982.
[6] Grice H. P, Meaning, The Philosophical Review, Duke University Press, Durham, 1957.
[7] Hallet L. G, Essentialism: A Wittgensteinian Critique, State University Press, New York 1991.
[8] Plantinga A, The Nature of Necessity, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1974.
[9] Munitz K. M, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Pearson College, London, 1981.
[10] Salmon N, Reference and Essence Prometheus Books, New York 1981.
[11] Kim J et al (ed), Metaphysics: An Anthology, Blackwell, USA, 2012.
[12] Kripke S, Naming and Necessity’, Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1980.
[13] Leibnitz, W. Monadology, in G H R Parkinson (ed.) Leibnitz: Philosophical Writings, Everyman’s Library, Dent, 1973.
[14] Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II (P. H. Nidditch, Ed.). Clarendon, Oxford, 1971.
[15] Mill, J. S, A System of Logic, Longmans Green & Co., London, 1875.
[16] Marcus R. B, Modalities, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.
[17] Marcus R. B, ‘Essential Attribution’, The Journal of Philosophy Columbia, 1971.
[18] Russell. B, “On Denoting” Munitz K. M Contemporary Analytic Philosophy,’ Pearson College, London, 1960.
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  • APA Style

    Sagarika Datta. (2023). Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Advances in Sciences and Humanities, 9(3), 90-96. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

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    Sagarika Datta. Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Adv. Sci. Humanit. 2023, 9(3), 90-96. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

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    AMA Style

    Sagarika Datta. Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Adv Sci Humanit. 2023;9(3):90-96. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11,
      author = {Sagarika Datta},
      title = {Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity},
      journal = {Advances in Sciences and Humanities},
      volume = {9},
      number = {3},
      pages = {90-96},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ash.20230903.11},
      abstract = {Here I have focused on R M Adams’s view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus’s notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term ‘individual essence’ – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as ‘Primitive thisness’ and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that de re identity or transworld identity is primitive in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.},
     year = {2023}
    }
    

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Author Information
  • Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, Delhi, India

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